BY MARIAM QURESHI
The South Asian Factor in the Iran War
This image is AI-generated.
One thing consistent about the Trump Administration is its sheer inconsistency. As Washington presents a 15-point plan through Pakistan to Iran, ostensibly to de-escalate the war, the Pentagon prepares for “weeks of ground invasion” as “thousands of U.S. marines arrive in the Middle East”. Quite like the military buildup amid negotiations prior to 28th February. It is no surprise that Iran rejected the 15-point plan, which called for a complete dismantling of Iranian nuclear infrastructure, handing over the uranium stockpiles to the International Atomic Energy Agency, considerably scaling down and limiting the missile program, opening the Strait of Hormuz, among other demands, which Iran sees as an attack on its sovereignty and security.
One argument is that the U.S. is under pressure to wrap up a war that, even after a month, it has not convincingly justified. The pressure, the argument goes, stems from the falling out with the European allies as they refuse to support the U.S. in its war or to open the Strait of Hormuz, from President Donald Trump’s falling ratings ahead of midterm elections, and the global economic crisis which has increased fuel prices and shortages, ramped up inflation, disrupted supply chains, affected stock markets all around the world.
These might have been concerns for the old United States, but the United States under Donald Trump has repeatedly shown that its allies are no longer a priority, whether that’s the sidelined Europeans repeatedly berated, or Japan and South Korea whose security needs are compromised to benefit the Iran war as Washington relocates troops and Patriot defense systems, or the regional Middle Eastern allies which are taking a beating without as much as an acknowledgement by their supposed security guarantor. And nor does Trump care about the unintended consequences of his policies; whether it is the economic impact of global tariffs imposed last year, or the question of ‘international law’ as Washington whisks the Venezuelan President away from his palace. Even in this case, these were expected consequences of the decision to attack Iran, and Trump went ahead with it anyway (for reasons still unclear). Therefore, this may be insufficient to force Trump to change his decision.
This raises two questions: Why is Pakistan (among others) seeking a diplomatic solution? And what happens if it fails?
Why is Pakistan Spearheading the Diplomatic Efforts?
Regional states, including Egypt, Turkey, and Oman, have made strides to provide a diplomatic off-ramp, but Pakistan appears to be spearheading the diplomatic campaign. Popular explanations for Pakistan’s role allude to the ethnic, religious, and cultural ties with Balochi and Shia populations existing in both the neighboring states of Iran and Pakistan. Also cited is the economic impact of the war on the Pakistani economy, and the concern for the overseas Pakistanis in the Gulf states who send a sizeable amount in foreign remittances to Pakistan, upon which not only many Pakistani families, but also Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserve rely.
Others argue that Pakistan is merely playing a familiar role, given its past mediation attempts: the most popular and successful being the 1972 thaw between the United States and China, but also the 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and more recently the 2020 talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban in Doha.
And indeed, particularly after the supposed military success in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict in May 2025, Pakistan is attempting to emerge as a key regional player, for example, by supplying $1.5 billion worth of weapons and jets to the Saudi-backed Sudanese Government, fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (backed by the UAE, though the UAE officially denies involvement). It has also conducted successful sales of the jointly produced Chinese JF-17 aircraft, among other weapons, to Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan, and there are talks for potential deals with Indonesia, Bangladesh, and even Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen and Libya (another front for Saudi-UAE proxy wars).
But as with everything in politics, the story is not that straightforward.
Pakistan’s ties with both Washington and Tehran are less than ideal. Only two years ago, Iranian missiles were fired on Pakistani territory in response to claims of terrorist and successionist activities emerging from Pakistan’s Balochistan province. For context, a secessionist movement has simmered for decades, seeking to create an independent homeland (including the Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan provinces and parts of Afghanistan’s territory). Additionally, the Iranian Baluchistan province is of strategic significance to India because of its investments in the Chabahar Port, mainly to counter Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Therefore, should the crisis escalate and bring Iran and Pakistan face-to-face, it will, once again, not be restricted.
Furthermore, and quite significantly, Pakistan has formalized its military and security ties with its old ally – Saudi Arabia, Iran’s strategic rival – with a Defense Agreement in September 2025. Additionally, the much hailed Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline project never took off under the U.S. sanctions on Iran, even though Iran and Pakistan share a border and could benefit from energy and trade cooperation. This is because Pakistan preferred not to jeopardize ties with Washington, and recently requested an out-of-court settlement of the project.
Ties with Washington, however, were jeopardized, but for different reasons. Although both Washington and Islamabad were apparent allies during the War on Terror, their relationship was routinely strained by American complaints that Pakistan was not doing enough to curb terrorism. Nonetheless, there was steady support in financial and military aid. These ties rapidly deteriorated after the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. The U.S. diplomatic enegagement and economic and military aid slowly waned as Washington accused Pakistan of continuing to harbor terrorists and their networks. They were at their lowest ebb after the U.S. pulled out troops from Afghanistan in 2021.
Under the Trump Administration, things improved by chance. The Pakistani government understood there was benefit in stroking Trump’s ego, which is why they were quick to support Trump’s claim of halting the four-day Indo-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, signing a critical mineral deal with Washington in September 2025, and by being at the forefront of the ‘peace deal of the century’ in Gaza (which was immediately violated – and continues to be – by Israel once the hostages were released), and supporting the Board of Peace, whatever that is.
Despite all tensions, Pakistan has attempted to find a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia, its ally, and Iran, its neighbor. Precisely why, at the beginning of the conflict, Pakistan expressed solidarity with Iran, keeping up with its old tradition. And the reciprocal warm exchanges from Iran also indicate that Tehran does not want to sour relations with its nuclear neighbor. Consequently, Pakistan is still a relatively neutral option, with no American bases and no direct involvement in the conflict (so far). Regardless, it is less likely that Pakistan has any leverage it can effectively use to bring Iran and the United States to the negotiating table, let alone convince them to a ceasefire.
But Pakistan has its concerns: it does not want to be dragged into the war, especially when the network for such an event is in place. If the war escalates and its ally Saudi Arabia decides to react offensively, Pakistan could indeed be pulled into a war with a neighbor with which it shares nearly a 900 km-long border.
The South Asian Factor
Earlier this year, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s regional rivals, India and the UAE, respectively, shared their interest in having a similar defense agreement when they announced their economic deal earlier this year. Shortly before the commencement of this war, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a second visit to Israel to meet Benjamin Netanyahu. Prior to the visit, Netanyahu announced his intention to “build a network of nations in or around the Middle East to collectively stand against what he called 'radical' Shia and Sunni adversaries”. Although the Sunni targets were undefined, it was clear that India would be part of the axis because it “sees eye to eye” with Israel. Indeed, the anti-Muslim stance of both leaders has brought them considerably closer. Pakistan – the Sunni nuclear-armed state – views this with concern, especially since there is a good chance the alignment could be used against Pakistan, as was the case during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 2025 when India used Israeli drones to attack Pakistan.
Given that there is an appetite in India to take military action against Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and the claims that Pakistan sponsors terrorism on Indian soil, and given Pakistan’s ongoing war with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is not willing to stretch itself thin.
With politics, one can hypothesize but can never be certain about outcomes, particularly in escalatory situations. Given that, while escalation may not bring Pakistan into direct conflict with Israel if it enters war on behalf of Saudi Arabia against Iran, it will likely present India with an opportunity to benefit from a militarily distracted rival. However, given India’s domestic economic concerns due to closure of Strait of Hormuz, and previously due to American tariffs, and of course, to some extent, international pressures to contain the war and not drag a decades old rivalry between two nuclear-armed neighbors into the mix, possibly from France and the EU, it is possible India may not capitalize on the opportunity. This does not make the situation any less volatile.
One argument is that the U.S. is under pressure to wrap up a war that, even after a month, it has not convincingly justified. The pressure, the argument goes, stems from the falling out with the European allies as they refuse to support the U.S. in its war or to open the Strait of Hormuz, from President Donald Trump’s falling ratings ahead of midterm elections, and the global economic crisis which has increased fuel prices and shortages, ramped up inflation, disrupted supply chains, affected stock markets all around the world.
These might have been concerns for the old United States, but the United States under Donald Trump has repeatedly shown that its allies are no longer a priority, whether that’s the sidelined Europeans repeatedly berated, or Japan and South Korea whose security needs are compromised to benefit the Iran war as Washington relocates troops and Patriot defense systems, or the regional Middle Eastern allies which are taking a beating without as much as an acknowledgement by their supposed security guarantor. And nor does Trump care about the unintended consequences of his policies; whether it is the economic impact of global tariffs imposed last year, or the question of ‘international law’ as Washington whisks the Venezuelan President away from his palace. Even in this case, these were expected consequences of the decision to attack Iran, and Trump went ahead with it anyway (for reasons still unclear). Therefore, this may be insufficient to force Trump to change his decision.
This raises two questions: Why is Pakistan (among others) seeking a diplomatic solution? And what happens if it fails?
Why is Pakistan Spearheading the Diplomatic Efforts?
Regional states, including Egypt, Turkey, and Oman, have made strides to provide a diplomatic off-ramp, but Pakistan appears to be spearheading the diplomatic campaign. Popular explanations for Pakistan’s role allude to the ethnic, religious, and cultural ties with Balochi and Shia populations existing in both the neighboring states of Iran and Pakistan. Also cited is the economic impact of the war on the Pakistani economy, and the concern for the overseas Pakistanis in the Gulf states who send a sizeable amount in foreign remittances to Pakistan, upon which not only many Pakistani families, but also Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserve rely.
Others argue that Pakistan is merely playing a familiar role, given its past mediation attempts: the most popular and successful being the 1972 thaw between the United States and China, but also the 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and more recently the 2020 talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban in Doha.
And indeed, particularly after the supposed military success in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict in May 2025, Pakistan is attempting to emerge as a key regional player, for example, by supplying $1.5 billion worth of weapons and jets to the Saudi-backed Sudanese Government, fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (backed by the UAE, though the UAE officially denies involvement). It has also conducted successful sales of the jointly produced Chinese JF-17 aircraft, among other weapons, to Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan, and there are talks for potential deals with Indonesia, Bangladesh, and even Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen and Libya (another front for Saudi-UAE proxy wars).
But as with everything in politics, the story is not that straightforward.
Pakistan’s ties with both Washington and Tehran are less than ideal. Only two years ago, Iranian missiles were fired on Pakistani territory in response to claims of terrorist and successionist activities emerging from Pakistan’s Balochistan province. For context, a secessionist movement has simmered for decades, seeking to create an independent homeland (including the Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan provinces and parts of Afghanistan’s territory). Additionally, the Iranian Baluchistan province is of strategic significance to India because of its investments in the Chabahar Port, mainly to counter Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Therefore, should the crisis escalate and bring Iran and Pakistan face-to-face, it will, once again, not be restricted.
Furthermore, and quite significantly, Pakistan has formalized its military and security ties with its old ally – Saudi Arabia, Iran’s strategic rival – with a Defense Agreement in September 2025. Additionally, the much hailed Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline project never took off under the U.S. sanctions on Iran, even though Iran and Pakistan share a border and could benefit from energy and trade cooperation. This is because Pakistan preferred not to jeopardize ties with Washington, and recently requested an out-of-court settlement of the project.
Ties with Washington, however, were jeopardized, but for different reasons. Although both Washington and Islamabad were apparent allies during the War on Terror, their relationship was routinely strained by American complaints that Pakistan was not doing enough to curb terrorism. Nonetheless, there was steady support in financial and military aid. These ties rapidly deteriorated after the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. The U.S. diplomatic enegagement and economic and military aid slowly waned as Washington accused Pakistan of continuing to harbor terrorists and their networks. They were at their lowest ebb after the U.S. pulled out troops from Afghanistan in 2021.
Under the Trump Administration, things improved by chance. The Pakistani government understood there was benefit in stroking Trump’s ego, which is why they were quick to support Trump’s claim of halting the four-day Indo-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, signing a critical mineral deal with Washington in September 2025, and by being at the forefront of the ‘peace deal of the century’ in Gaza (which was immediately violated – and continues to be – by Israel once the hostages were released), and supporting the Board of Peace, whatever that is.
Despite all tensions, Pakistan has attempted to find a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia, its ally, and Iran, its neighbor. Precisely why, at the beginning of the conflict, Pakistan expressed solidarity with Iran, keeping up with its old tradition. And the reciprocal warm exchanges from Iran also indicate that Tehran does not want to sour relations with its nuclear neighbor. Consequently, Pakistan is still a relatively neutral option, with no American bases and no direct involvement in the conflict (so far). Regardless, it is less likely that Pakistan has any leverage it can effectively use to bring Iran and the United States to the negotiating table, let alone convince them to a ceasefire.
But Pakistan has its concerns: it does not want to be dragged into the war, especially when the network for such an event is in place. If the war escalates and its ally Saudi Arabia decides to react offensively, Pakistan could indeed be pulled into a war with a neighbor with which it shares nearly a 900 km-long border.
The South Asian Factor
Earlier this year, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s regional rivals, India and the UAE, respectively, shared their interest in having a similar defense agreement when they announced their economic deal earlier this year. Shortly before the commencement of this war, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a second visit to Israel to meet Benjamin Netanyahu. Prior to the visit, Netanyahu announced his intention to “build a network of nations in or around the Middle East to collectively stand against what he called 'radical' Shia and Sunni adversaries”. Although the Sunni targets were undefined, it was clear that India would be part of the axis because it “sees eye to eye” with Israel. Indeed, the anti-Muslim stance of both leaders has brought them considerably closer. Pakistan – the Sunni nuclear-armed state – views this with concern, especially since there is a good chance the alignment could be used against Pakistan, as was the case during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 2025 when India used Israeli drones to attack Pakistan.
Given that there is an appetite in India to take military action against Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and the claims that Pakistan sponsors terrorism on Indian soil, and given Pakistan’s ongoing war with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is not willing to stretch itself thin.
With politics, one can hypothesize but can never be certain about outcomes, particularly in escalatory situations. Given that, while escalation may not bring Pakistan into direct conflict with Israel if it enters war on behalf of Saudi Arabia against Iran, it will likely present India with an opportunity to benefit from a militarily distracted rival. However, given India’s domestic economic concerns due to closure of Strait of Hormuz, and previously due to American tariffs, and of course, to some extent, international pressures to contain the war and not drag a decades old rivalry between two nuclear-armed neighbors into the mix, possibly from France and the EU, it is possible India may not capitalize on the opportunity. This does not make the situation any less volatile.
The map shows main strategic rivalries in red (Iran vs Israel; Iran vs Saudi Arabia; Iran vs UAE; India vs Pakistan; Pakistan vs Afghanistan; India vs China) and friendly ties in green (Afghanistan and India; China and Pakistan; Israel and India; UAE and India; Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). It is important to note that: a) India shares good ties with Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan with UAE, b) the shift in nature of ties of Pakistan and India with Afghanistan have been a recent development; previously, Kabul has been closer to Islamabad than New Delhi, and c) Pakistan does not recognise Israel.
Who benefits from escalation?
It is also worth noting that many states stand to benefit from escalation. Israel, for example, started the war together with the U.S., and does not seek de-escalation. It continues to treat the Iranian regime as an existential threat and is therefore less willing to negotiate than the United States. Even if the U.S. proceeds with de-escalation, will it be able to convince Israel to negotiate with Iran as well? And will that ceasefire hold or suffer a fate like the one in Gaza and Lebanon?
Apparently, Saudi Arabia also wants the U.S. to ‘finish the job’ as recent intelligence sources claim. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE perceive Iran as a strategic threat because of its intensive buildup of ballistic missiles and efforts to procure nuclear weapons, and its network of proxies. It has been increasingly evident that the U.S. is no longer a reliable security ally, e.g., in 2019, when the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen attacked the two most significant Saudi oil facilities of Abqaiq and Khurais, Washington only gave a muted response. And even today, the Gulf states are under constant fire from Iran since the war began, initially with attacks on U.S. bases on their territories, which have now expanded to include civilian infrastructure. These attacks have considerably impacted the economic and social life of these countries; the U.S. has taken no concrete steps to defend its Middle Eastern allies. Although these states may be frustrated with the chaos that has ensued from a war they did not want, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia want to benefit from a weakened Iran. However, even if in the short term they see it as a weakening of one strategic rival, in the bigger picture, a strong, aggressive, and nuclear-armed Israel stands to pose a bigger threat.
The surge in oil prices and waivers to countries like India to buy the previously sanctioned Russian oil are helping Russia sell more of its energy resources. As America expends its resources in another war, which shows no sign of stopping, both Russia and China are happy to sit and watch, capitalizing on the opportunity to secure their interests in Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively.
What then?
Iran’s last remaining proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, officially entered the War on 29th March with attacks on Israel. There are widespread speculations that an American ground invasion is imminent. Israel is already intensifying its actions in Southern Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Syria. Indeed, Iran, although considerably weaker militarily, has managed to survive a long war of attrition, and continues to do so. It has used its geographic location to inflict pain on the global economy by targeting energy infrastructure in the Gulf states and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, thereby disrupting supply chains and raising oil prices. With Houthis now officially part of the war, they can disrupt the flow through the Red Sea and along the passage to the Suez Canal, further increasing the economic crisis. The relatively cheaper Iranian drones and missiles have overwhelmed the million-dollar U.S. defense systems. If ground invasion were to occur, the mountanious Iranian terrain means the American soldiers will be bogged down in a long war with a fate similar (or perhaps much worse) than previous such adventures.
Iranian demands include a complete end to the war with guarantees, reparations for damages, and recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. It is difficult to reach a negotiated consensus when interests and demands diverge so widely. Perhaps, before finding a middle ground, it is more important to find the will to do so. The repeated assassination of top leadership will not bring about regime change, but it will bring more hardline politicians to the fore as the potential power brokers, such as Ali Larijani, who might have been willing to seek a compromise, are eliminated.
So far, there appears to be no easy way out of this war. As Saudi, Turkish, and Egyptian Foreign Ministers meet in Islamabad, it is evident that war and the Middle Eastern conflict more broadly is no longer contained. It has spread widely enough for new alignments to form, with members in each alignment often having contradictory goals, further diminishing the possibility of stability.
It is also worth noting that many states stand to benefit from escalation. Israel, for example, started the war together with the U.S., and does not seek de-escalation. It continues to treat the Iranian regime as an existential threat and is therefore less willing to negotiate than the United States. Even if the U.S. proceeds with de-escalation, will it be able to convince Israel to negotiate with Iran as well? And will that ceasefire hold or suffer a fate like the one in Gaza and Lebanon?
Apparently, Saudi Arabia also wants the U.S. to ‘finish the job’ as recent intelligence sources claim. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE perceive Iran as a strategic threat because of its intensive buildup of ballistic missiles and efforts to procure nuclear weapons, and its network of proxies. It has been increasingly evident that the U.S. is no longer a reliable security ally, e.g., in 2019, when the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen attacked the two most significant Saudi oil facilities of Abqaiq and Khurais, Washington only gave a muted response. And even today, the Gulf states are under constant fire from Iran since the war began, initially with attacks on U.S. bases on their territories, which have now expanded to include civilian infrastructure. These attacks have considerably impacted the economic and social life of these countries; the U.S. has taken no concrete steps to defend its Middle Eastern allies. Although these states may be frustrated with the chaos that has ensued from a war they did not want, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia want to benefit from a weakened Iran. However, even if in the short term they see it as a weakening of one strategic rival, in the bigger picture, a strong, aggressive, and nuclear-armed Israel stands to pose a bigger threat.
The surge in oil prices and waivers to countries like India to buy the previously sanctioned Russian oil are helping Russia sell more of its energy resources. As America expends its resources in another war, which shows no sign of stopping, both Russia and China are happy to sit and watch, capitalizing on the opportunity to secure their interests in Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively.
What then?
Iran’s last remaining proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, officially entered the War on 29th March with attacks on Israel. There are widespread speculations that an American ground invasion is imminent. Israel is already intensifying its actions in Southern Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Syria. Indeed, Iran, although considerably weaker militarily, has managed to survive a long war of attrition, and continues to do so. It has used its geographic location to inflict pain on the global economy by targeting energy infrastructure in the Gulf states and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, thereby disrupting supply chains and raising oil prices. With Houthis now officially part of the war, they can disrupt the flow through the Red Sea and along the passage to the Suez Canal, further increasing the economic crisis. The relatively cheaper Iranian drones and missiles have overwhelmed the million-dollar U.S. defense systems. If ground invasion were to occur, the mountanious Iranian terrain means the American soldiers will be bogged down in a long war with a fate similar (or perhaps much worse) than previous such adventures.
Iranian demands include a complete end to the war with guarantees, reparations for damages, and recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. It is difficult to reach a negotiated consensus when interests and demands diverge so widely. Perhaps, before finding a middle ground, it is more important to find the will to do so. The repeated assassination of top leadership will not bring about regime change, but it will bring more hardline politicians to the fore as the potential power brokers, such as Ali Larijani, who might have been willing to seek a compromise, are eliminated.
So far, there appears to be no easy way out of this war. As Saudi, Turkish, and Egyptian Foreign Ministers meet in Islamabad, it is evident that war and the Middle Eastern conflict more broadly is no longer contained. It has spread widely enough for new alignments to form, with members in each alignment often having contradictory goals, further diminishing the possibility of stability.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.