On 7^th August 2026, leaders of Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia met in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to sign a defence agreement declaring that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. The oil-rich Saudi Arabia brings its economic leverage; Turkey, a NATO member, has a budding indigenous defence industry, and the nuclear-armed Pakistan has a China-backed military potential.

This agreement comes at a time when the Houthis attack the Saudis in the Red Sea, Turkey finds itself increasingly at odds with Israel, and Pakistan stands in conflict with two of its neighbours: India and Afghanistan (with the third, Iran, occupied in War with the United States). Yet, the member states repeatedly clarified that this is solely a defence agreement, not intended against a single adversary. If so, then what has brought these three states together in the first place?

The Saudi Conundrum
For Riyadh, aligning with Islamabad was a relatively straightforward decision. Both signed a defence agreement in September last year. Since 1967, Pakistan has trained over 8,000 Saudi armed forces personnel, conducted joint military exercises, and sent troops to Saudi Arabia during the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Saudi Arabia kept the Pakistani economy afloat with $3.4 billion in financial support amidst U.S. sanctions for developing nuclear weapons. And it continues to provide oil and cash to the economically vulnerable South Asian country to date.

But Turkey was a peculiar choice. Indeed, Turkey is a NATO ally with the largest army in the alliance after the U.S., and it has an impressively developing indigenous defence industry. Turkish drones have featured in the Ukraine War, the 2020 War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the civil wars in Syria and Libya, and Sudan. It also produces, or is in the process of producing, missile and rocket systems, air defence systems, frigates, and land vehicles, including tanks and mine-resistant vehicles. But, in the not-so-far past, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been fierce rivals.

With Ottoman imperial history in the region not forgotten, both have also quarrelled over Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and for Qatar (along with Iran) during the diplomatic crisis in 2017. The relationship worsened dramatically after the killing of the Saudi-U.S. journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Turkey.

Despite these tensions, both states operate in precarious conditions. The Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) reigns over a Kingdom held together by a delicate thread. It is ruled by a single family with many possible contenders for the throne. It is also a country where the cheaply imported South Asian labour force accounts for most of the employment against a bulging Saudi youth population which lacks the necessary skills for any employment. Traditionally sustained by the oil wealth and heavily subsidised energy and everyday necessities, its manufacturing sector – though at a four-decade high – accounts for only 16% of the GDP as of 2025.

And despite spending heavily on its military – 7.3% of its GDP in 2024 (more than twice that of the U.S.) – the Saudi army has little to show for it. And if that is insufficient, Saudi Arabia has an unhealthy reliance on the United States for arms imports: nearly 77% from 2021-2025, followed by Spain (9.5%) and France (4.6%).
With domestic troubles amid rising regional insecurity, Riyadh's optimal choice is to limit its enemies and maximise its options. This is also why, when Iran started targeting the states across the Strait in response to the U.S. and Israeli attacks, Saudi Arabia was not hit as hard as the pro-Israel UAE. And also, why Saudi Arabia did not mention the Pak-Saudi Defence Agreement. Though even if it would have, it would have been unlikely for Pakistan to open a third front with another neighbour. But this does not mean that ties between Iran and Pakistan have been ideal.

Only two years ago, Iran fired missiles at Pakistan allegedly in response to terrorist and secessionist activities emerging from Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. For context, a secessionist movement has simmered for decades, seeking to create an independent homeland (including the Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan provinces and parts of Afghanistan’s territory).

This agreement does not mean Riyadh and Ankara have resolved all their differences, but at the very least, it means they are no longer outright rivals. The door is left ajar.

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Indeed, Saudi Arabia continues to be hit by the Houthis in Yemen, and they are traditionally associated with Iran. In Yemen Endures, Ginny Hill argues that the Houthis (predominantly Shia Zaidi’s) independently rose to regain control in North Yemen, but used the slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel” to practically ask Iran for help against their common enemy (Saudi Arabia) and found ties with Iran’s sponsored Hamas and Hezbollah. Therefore, that does not necessarily mean that they are working for Tehran. Houthis independently view Saudi Arabia as an enemy because it meddled in the Yemeni conflict. It is also worth remembering that the present-day Saudi provinces of Asir, Najran, and Jizan were taken by Saudi Arabia only after a war with Yemen in 1934.

What is in it for Turkey?
Like MBS, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds power on shaky foundations: one cannot effectively run a state by imprisoning all opposition amid a flailing economy. But aside from a weakened currency, high inflation, and the cost of living, Turkey has regional concerns. And Turkey and NATO have a less than ideal relationship: the territorial dispute over Cyprus with Greece (also NATO members), Turkey’s refusal to support the U.S. over Iraq War in 2003, the U.S. support for the Kurds in Syria against ISIS, and the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400 Defence Systems in 2017, which prompted Turkey’s expulsion from the U.S. F-35 program, numerous sanctions, and chants of expulsion from NATO (even though no formal mechanism exists within the alliance to achieve that).

Nonetheless, Turkey continues to keep its ties with Russia by purchasing its oil despite the ‘Western’ sanctions. At the same time, NATO is no longer a reliable security guarantee, not least because of this brawl, but because even the NATO allies are in a difficult predicament themselves.

Although Washington’s grievances over European defence spending is nothing new, President Trump deepened these divisions among the transatlantic allies by threatening to abandon NATO altogether, threatening to annexing Greenland (casually reminded once again during the NATO Summit in July), wanting to make Canada the 51^st U.S. state, and consistently berating the European allies for not supporting the Iran War, while saying the NATO troops “stayed a little back, a little off the front lines” during the Afghanistan War.

European NATO members rely on increasingly uncertain U.S. security guarantees and, without alternatives, at least in the short and medium term. NATO’s European “allies” have conflicting interests, threat perceptions and internal divisions. If the U.S. continues this trajectory, it remains to be seen how the transatlantic “allies” keep the alliance together sans the United States.

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The Turkish and Israeli ties also continue to deteriorate.

In February 2026, Prime Minister Netanyahu, while addressing his Cabinet, stated his intention to build a network of allied nations against “radical adversaries”. “A ‘hexagon’ of alliances around or within the Middle East [consisting of states] that see eye to eye on the reality and challenges [of] both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck. Very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis”, he said. While the Shia-majority Iran was obvious, he did not specify the Sunni states. Still, it may not be wrong to think that Saudi Arabia (not part of the Abraham Accords), Turkey, and the nuclear-armed Pakistan, which has signed this defence agreement with both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are on the list. Admittedly, Pakistan and Israel may not share direct rivalry, but this does not mean that Pakistan is immune. Pakistan’s strategic rival and nuclear-armed neighbour, India, relies on Israeli drones and weapons in confrontations against Pakistan.

In fact, shortly after making the above statement, PM Netanyahu welcomed India’s PM, Modi. Indeed, the anti-Muslim stance of both Israeli and Indian leaders has brought them considerably closer. But they both have developed closer partnerships with Greece and Cyprus – the other two regional states which share territorial disputes with Turkey.

Israel, Greece, and Cyprus jointly signed a strategic partnership in December 2025, where all parties agreed to energy interconnections, trade, and joint military exercises. In May 2026, Cyprus and India elevated their ties to a “strategic partnership”. Greece and India did the same during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Athens in 2023. Turkey has not missed this: it deployed F16 fighter jets in Northern Cyprus (recognised only by Turkey) as a countermeasure to the F-35s given to Greece.
As this nexus develops, let us not forget the UAE: a member of the Abraham Accords, a strategic rival to both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with a close relationship with India and, most importantly, a clear pro-Israeli disposition.

Not to mention that the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel kickstarted not only the ongoing Gaza War but also provided the pretext for Netanyahu to advance both its regional and territorial ambitions by attacking regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and even Qatar.

Following this, Turkey suspended economic trade with Israel, although it continued to allow its very close ally Azerbaijan to send oil to Israel through its pipeline and maritime shipping route.

More recently, Turkish officials have said, “Israel is a burden humanity can no longer bear”. The Israeli Parliament formally recognised the Armenian Genocide and has taken Turkish statements as an existential threat to Israel. In short: relations between these two states – once friends – are at the lowest ebb.

And the United States?
The modus operandi of the Trump Administration is to change policies multiple times a day. Indeed, the White House is unclear (or doesn’t know) what it wants. But at this moment, the biggest priority for Trump is to find an exit out of this senseless war with Iran.

It may appear, though, that Washington has tried to rope in its “allies” by dangling a nuclear deal in front of Riyadh, and promising Ankara F35s and lifting of sanctions. But let us not forget that the very next day, after signing the nuclear deal, Trump added the conditionality of Saudi acceptance of the Abraham Accords. Likewise, the U.S. asked Turkey to get rid of its S-400 defence systems to acquire F-35s, which it may not receive because doing so would upend Israeli military superiority in the region.

Chances are that both measures were not a signal to Riyadh or Ankara, but a message to Tel Aviv. Israel and the United States are increasingly at odds with each other over the objectives (if any) of the Iran War. Trump may say that “nobody tells him what to do” following Netanyahu’s protests at commitments offered to Erdogan. Still, the truth is that Netanyahu has told him what to do, twice: once, last year before the 12-day war with Iran, and again, this year before the commencement of the ongoing war with Iran. The lack of coherence and reliability in Trump’s promises is not lost on either MBS or Erdogan.

And Pakistan?
It is difficult to ignore the only Muslim state with nuclear weapons (not the UK, despite what JD Vance and Netanyahu say). Still, Pakistan may simply be enjoying the diplomatic boost it has received by thoroughly and endlessly praising Trump: beginning with nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize for ostensibly brokering a ceasefire during the India-Pakistan conflict in May last year (which New Delhi denies), then by participating in the so-called Board of Peace, and now acting as a ‘mediator’ in this U.S.-Iran War.

But because Pakistan is the common denominator, and India on the other side of the axis, an out-of-control Middle Eastern conflict can become a South Asian problem as well.

Then, what does this pact mean?
All three states have been traditional recipients of the U.S. security guarantees, which not only have become increasingly unreliable – Washington has completely abandoned its regional allies during the ongoing U.S.-Iran War – but the U.S. now quite literally lacks the adequate resources to fulfil its global commitments. Reportedly, the United States has burned through weapons faster than it can replenish.

And as the U.S. retrenches, China (the only possible contender to the U.S.), though interested in economic engagements, is neither prepared nor willing to take up security responsibilities for any state.

It is, of course, an attempt by second-tier states to fill the political vacuum created and balance the axis forming with Israel-India-UAE and others. Still, it is simply an alignment of short-term objectives. The long-term strategic objectives, priorities, interests, and relative threat perceptions vary among members. For example, Pakistan would certainly not want to open another Middle Eastern front while it engages with Afghanistan and India within its region. Turkey is unlikely to intervene against India.

This would hold even if the pact extended to Egypt, Kuwait, or Oman, which is why there could be no Islamic NATO. No single enemy or aligned interest exists, and whatever interests there are could shift amid a volatile and changing international context.

Regardless, amid growing uncertainty and instability, these pacts may, in the short term, offer some illusion of deterrence and, at the very least, quell rivalries, as in the case of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the long run, they only lead to further instability because states scramble to secure their own interests.

This is today. Elections are approaching in both Israel and the United States. It may change the context once again.