Russian President Vladimir Putin was very warmly received by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to India from 4-5 December 2025. This was expected; both countries have had a special relationship since at least 1955, when Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin visited India for a 19-day visit. This was later solidified by the 1971 Treaty of Friendship. And even today, both countries remain crucial for each other. But behind the pomp and show and the enthusiastic exchanges, although many agreements were signed on issues including shipbuilding, investment in new shipping lanes, visa-free travel, labour and migration concerns, and even critical minerals, there was no concrete defence or oil deal. This was also expected, given the precarious situation India is in because of its multi-alignment policy.

What happened?
The India-Russia partnership shone most in the defence sector, with Russia accounting for nearly 72% of India’s defence imports from 2010-2015, according to SIPRI. Although these numbers declined steadily (55% from 2015-2019, to 36% from 2020-2024), this was not because of worsening ties between India and Russia, but because of India’s ambition to diversify its sources and increase domestic manufacturing (in line with its ambition to become a rising power). To convince Russia of this, India, despite pressure from ‘Western’ governments, did not condemn its actions in Ukraine; instead, since the Ukraine War began in 2022, India’s oil imports from Russia increased from 2.5% to 35%, benefiting from price discounts after the U.S. and European sanctions on Russia.

Following the recent conflict with Pakistan, where the Russian S-400 defence system played a key role, India may be looking to purchase Russia’s Su-57 (fifth-generation stealth fighter) to match Pakistan’s purchase of the Chinese J-35, and also upgrade to the S-500 defence system. But it also has to wait until 2026 for delivery of critical components for its current S-400 defence system and other Russian manufactured aircraft and military equipment on which the Indian military relies. The delay in obtaining parts and equipment, because of sanctions after the Ukraine War, was another reason why India did not sign a defence deal with Russia since 2022, and perhaps why even now, lacking assurances on timely deliveries, it remains reluctant.

However, this is not the only reason for India’s caution regarding Russia. India has significant foreign policy ambitions: it wants to be the leader of the so-called ‘Global South’ and emerge as a rising power, while it confronts two nuclear-armed neighbours and strategic rivalries: China and Pakistan. India also knows it cannot rely on the U.S. now; the Trump Administration put a 50% tariff on India, out of which 25% was allegedly a penalty for importing and financing the Russian war in Ukraine. This forced India to scale back Russian oil imports and compensate by importing from the U.S. While the U.S. offered some respite on farm goods, the tariffs remain largely in place. Of course, this was a blow to the strategic autonomy India had proudly safeguarded, but more importantly, it has upended the otherwise years of cordial ties between New Delhi and Washington despite the former’s partnership with Russia (mostly out of the U.S. need to use India as an anchor in Indo-Pacific to counter the Chinese threat). 

As India looks to Europe, Japan, Australia, and most importantly, France, for alternatives for defence, new markets, trade, minerals, and technology to resist dependency on China, it is met with skepticism regarding its ties with Russia, despite the common ground against the Chinese threat. The trouble with wanting to be friends with everyone is that one ends up being friends with no one. Perhaps this is why, despite Putin’s assurances of ‘uninterrupted oil supplies’, Modi – already feeling the pressure of U.S. tariffs – was reluctant to sign a deal that could jeopardise India’s ties with ‘the West’.

What about Putin?
For Putin, his visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in September, and now, his visit to India, is to signal to the U.S., Europeans, Japanese, and others, that despite their efforts, Russia is not isolated. But Russia, already struggling with a demographic decline and the consequences of its war economy, is crumbling under the pressure of sanctions. Brought closer to China due to their mutual distrust of the rapidly declining U.S.-led order, Russia began to rely on China to keep its economy afloat. As this dependency increases in critical sectors like trade, energy, technology, and investments, giving China significant leverage, Russia is seeking to reduce this dependency. Therefore, Putin turned to India, looking for defence, oil, and trade deals to relieve pressures on its economy. 

While a growing Russian dependency on China is unlikely to sit well with India, it is also in a difficult situation, unable to extend the same support to the partnership that has remained relatively stable and reliable for India for decades. At the least, both countries have conveyed that they cannot risk losing the other. At the same time, the outcome clearly underscores that this time, both leaders met from a position of weakness, not strength.