by Mariam Qureshi
India's Multi-Alignment Dilemma
The image was created using ChatGPT.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in seven years to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin. Although this visit was a noticeable warming in relations between the two strategic rivals — following the sharp diplomatic downturn after the 2020 border skirmishes — it would be simplistic to attribute it directly to the 50% tariffs imposed by the United States on India.
Indeed, tensions between New Delhi and Washington have steadily escalated under Trump 2.0: from a public dispute over whether President Trump mediated the May ceasefire between India and Pakistan, to his successful efforts in persuading Apple to halt its planned investments in India, to his imposition of tariffs on India for importing oil from Russia and therefore financing the war in Ukraine, to changes to the H-1B visa policy that will disproportionately affect India’s highly skilled workers. Despite these strains, India’s partnership with the United States remains a crucial counterweight to China — one that New Delhi is unwilling to jeopardise.
At the same time, any cooperation between India and China will be constrained by their divergent strategic interests, which heavily shapes India’s broader foreign policy posture. India’s multi-alignment strategy was conceived to preserve its strategic autonomy and pursue an independent foreign policy. Yet this very approach has produced its own dilemmas: as India tries to straddle and maintain ties with ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ powers, both see India as an unreliable actor on the global stage.
India’s Strategic Rivalry with China
India and China have a longstanding dispute over territorial boundaries and the sovereignty of Tibet. China is vexed at India’s decision to grant refuge to the Dalai Lama, as well as New Delhi’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Both states aspire to lead the so-called Global South, and like China, India seeks “superpower” status — whatever that may entail – which adds to the strategic tensions between both neighbours.
Barring Indian domestic impediments that could prevent this ambition from materialising in the near future, China’s growing influence across small states in India’s neighbourhood once regarded as Indian vassal states illustrates the deepening rivalry. China, under the ‘string of pearls’ strategy, establishes its influence on the ports of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, which in turn limits Indian control and influence in its waterways and neighbourhood. Not only this, through diplomatic initiatives, high-profile meetings, military and economic incentives offered to both governments and opposition parties in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal, Beijing emerged as a stronger alternative to Indian dependence for these states. This coupled with internal domestic and economic discord in these states resulted in upheavals that demanded a restructuring of old frameworks that once staunchly favoured New Delhi to now develop ties with Beijing. To be clear, these smaller states prefer to balance relations with both powers and to capitalise on their rivalry. Yet while they have not severed ties with India, New Delhi’s influence has considerably waned in favour of Beijing — an uncomfortable reality for India.
Indeed, tensions between New Delhi and Washington have steadily escalated under Trump 2.0: from a public dispute over whether President Trump mediated the May ceasefire between India and Pakistan, to his successful efforts in persuading Apple to halt its planned investments in India, to his imposition of tariffs on India for importing oil from Russia and therefore financing the war in Ukraine, to changes to the H-1B visa policy that will disproportionately affect India’s highly skilled workers. Despite these strains, India’s partnership with the United States remains a crucial counterweight to China — one that New Delhi is unwilling to jeopardise.
At the same time, any cooperation between India and China will be constrained by their divergent strategic interests, which heavily shapes India’s broader foreign policy posture. India’s multi-alignment strategy was conceived to preserve its strategic autonomy and pursue an independent foreign policy. Yet this very approach has produced its own dilemmas: as India tries to straddle and maintain ties with ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ powers, both see India as an unreliable actor on the global stage.
India’s Strategic Rivalry with China
India and China have a longstanding dispute over territorial boundaries and the sovereignty of Tibet. China is vexed at India’s decision to grant refuge to the Dalai Lama, as well as New Delhi’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Both states aspire to lead the so-called Global South, and like China, India seeks “superpower” status — whatever that may entail – which adds to the strategic tensions between both neighbours.
Barring Indian domestic impediments that could prevent this ambition from materialising in the near future, China’s growing influence across small states in India’s neighbourhood once regarded as Indian vassal states illustrates the deepening rivalry. China, under the ‘string of pearls’ strategy, establishes its influence on the ports of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, which in turn limits Indian control and influence in its waterways and neighbourhood. Not only this, through diplomatic initiatives, high-profile meetings, military and economic incentives offered to both governments and opposition parties in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal, Beijing emerged as a stronger alternative to Indian dependence for these states. This coupled with internal domestic and economic discord in these states resulted in upheavals that demanded a restructuring of old frameworks that once staunchly favoured New Delhi to now develop ties with Beijing. To be clear, these smaller states prefer to balance relations with both powers and to capitalise on their rivalry. Yet while they have not severed ties with India, New Delhi’s influence has considerably waned in favour of Beijing — an uncomfortable reality for India.
To make matters worse, China remains a close ally of India’s regional rival, Pakistan. Chinese military technology and weaponry were deployed successfully by Pakistan in a four-day conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours last May.
Strategic rivalry between India and China is also evident beneath the surface of any economic cooperation. While New Delhi seeks cooperation that allows it to benefit from Chinese industrial inputs and technological expertise to advance its own growth, Beijing’s engagement remains largely selective — driven by efforts to deepen India’s economic dependence on China. India’s trade deficit with China reached a staggering $99.2 billion in FY 2024–25, and its reliance on China for essentials such as rare-earth minerals has revealed a significant vulnerability. In early 2025, China curtailed the supply of rare-earth minerals, fertilisers, and tunnel-boring machines to India. Although the restriction was lifted in August 2025, it had already taken a toll on the Indian economy, particularly by constraining production in the automobile sector.
Dependence on China is a liability New Delhi is determined to avoid. To mitigate such vulnerabilities — not only vis-à-vis China but any external power that might limit its strategic autonomy — India pursues a “multi-alignment” policy, engaging simultaneously with multiple major powers rather than aligning exclusively with one.
India Diversifies Strategic Partners: From Moscow to Paris
Since gaining independence in 1947, India maintained a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. However, the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union marked a significant shift, forging a deep strategic partnership that endured for decades. Russia remained India’s largest supplier of arms until the 2010s, when New Delhi began diversifying its defence portfolio. This was both because of India’s ‘superpower’ ambition which led it to prioritise self-reliance, and growing concerns over the quality of Russian equipment, procurement delays, and cost overruns. The Ukraine War in 2022 accelerated this process: India suspended and even cancelled several defence procurements due to supply chain disruptions, payment complications, and Russia’s own decision to limit arms exports.
Nonetheless, India did not completely forsake Russia for it still remains a major defence partner. Joint production continues, and India still manufactures Russian-designed weaponry. According to SIPRI, Russia was India’s top arms supplier from 2013 to 2022, although exports declined by 37%, with France filling much of the gap. This diversification also did not lead to hostility between New Delhi and Moscow. Despite U.S. pressure, India refrained from explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and from joining Western sanctions. Instead, bilateral trade expanded, especially in the energy sector, illustrating India’s effort to balance relations between both Washington and Moscow rather than aligning exclusively with either.
India’s multi-alignment approach and its drive to diversify arms imports paved the way for a deepening partnership with France. Between 2018 and 2022, India became the largest recipient of French arms exports, which accounted for nearly 30% of its total imports. Bilateral trade stood at $15 billion in FY 2023-24, though French foreign direct investment (FDI) struggled to gain ground. French retail giants such as Carrefour and Auchan struggled to perform well in Indian markets due to India’s restrictive FDI conditions and were forced to exit the market altogether in 2014. More recently, both countries have sought to revitalise their relationship to reduce dependency on both the U.S. and China. In February 2025, Prime Minister Modi visited France to secure a €10.6 billion arms deal, including the acquisition of Rafale jets—notably the same model shot down by Pakistan using Chinese weaponry—and Scorpene submarines. French defence equipment remains attractive to India despite its high cost, largely because it does not come with the operational protocols typically imposed under U.S. arms agreements.
President Macron also expressed France’s willingness to take the lead in the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) — announced at the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conceptually, IMEC promises regional integration and supply chain security, yet persistent instability in the Middle East, substantial financing constraints, and the European Union’s continued dependency on Chinese imports continues to hinder its progress. Nonetheless, the initiative reflects the growing willingness of other states to construct alternative frameworks to the increasingly unreliable structures offered by the existing great powers. The mounting government debt and social unrest over pension laws unleashed a political crisis, whose persistence has triggered a cyclical loop which continues to fuel economic and market uncertainity in the country. Amidst this, the growing support for the far-right ‘National Rally’, with its strong nationalist and protectionist policies, will certainly constrict France’s ability to enhance immigration, trade, and even security with India (and others).
India’s Indo-Pacific Partners
China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific put India in the spotlight for the U.S. Japan and Australia in 2007, when the four nations met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) — an initiative aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. After remaining dormant for nearly a decade, the QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, its members have intermittently coordinated on economic and security initiatives. Now, amid the growing perception of U.S. unreliability in upholding commitments under the second Trump administration, India seeks to deepen its engagement with multiple partners to diversify its strategic dependencies.
Before his visit to China, Prime Minister Modi stopped in Japan to meet then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Modi’s visit focused on economic diversification, with India pledging to supply the human capital that Japan urgently needs, while seeking to benefit from Japan’s technological expertise. Both sides agreed to a $68 billion investment framework over the next decade covering artificial intelligence, advanced technology, space cooperation, semiconductors, and rare-earth minerals, among other sectors. However, it remains to be seen how effectively India can capitalise on this foreign direct investment, given its domestic protectionist policies and persistent bureaucratic bottlenecks. Likewise, while Japan’s ageing population could benefit from increased immigration, internal political turmoil may impede such progress. With Prime Minister Ishiba’s resignation in early September, Japan is now poised to choose its fourth leader in five years, amid the rising influence of the far-right Sanseito Party, particularly known for its anti-immigration stance.
Although the two countries signed the Critical Minerals Security Partnership in 2022—aimed at facilitating Australian investment in mineral exploration and developing alternatives to Chinese supply chains—the prospects remain uncertain amid heavy Chinese subsidies and, in response, substantial U.S. counter-subsidies.
Australia is also concerned by China’s growing regional influence and regards India as a potential partner to help balance it. However, unlike Japan and India, which both face direct territorial disputes with Beijing, Australia does not have any immediate security threat from China. This has contributed to its reluctance to expand defence and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, thereby constraining deeper strategic engagement with New Delhi. While multi-alignment strategy has opened potential possibilities of partnership with states, particularly those who share India’s China threat, the extent to which these partnerships could be deepened and strengthened remains a challenge. And not always does it work in the benefit of India to have multiple alignments, especially in an international system so complex.
India’s Russia Problem
Immediately after the SCO, Modi held telephone conversations with top EU leaders. After a successful Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with UK in May, India is now seeking the same with EU. Trade between the two has grown substantially: by 2024, the EU became India’s second largest trading partner accounting for 11.5% of India’s total trade. While the EU views India as a huge market for defence exports, the path towards an FTA is fraught with challenges. Russia remains a thorn in India’s efforts to maintain ties with the United States, and even the European bloc.
Putting aside President Trump’s insistence that the European Union impose 100% tariffs on Indian good, as a retaliatory measure for India’s alleged financing of the Ukraine War (India’s imports of Russian oil now account for 35-40% of its total energy requirements, a sharp rise from just 3% before the Ukraine War), India’s recent participation in the Russia-led defensive military exercises in Belarus in mid-September against possible NATO invasion has drawn sharp criticism from European diplomats. This development is especially concerning for the EU and the ‘West’, coming so soon after Russia’s violation of NATO airspace in early September.
The Limits of Multi-Alignment
India’s foreign policy primarily revolves around efforts to counter China’s growing influence, yet its broader engagement with the world remains marked by contradictions. It aspires to superpower status and economic self-reliance, but these ambitions are constrained by deep-seated domestic challenges and dependence on external partners for critical resources and technological expertise.
Structural weaknesses—such as an underdeveloped manufacturing base, stark development inequalities between the North and South, persistent rural–urban divides, and enduring social cleavages rooted in the caste system—undermine India’s internal cohesion. The rise of Hindu nationalist politics and intensifying communal tensions further complicate its international image, creating a political environment that is not conducive to inclusive economic growth or sustained global leadership. These domestic limitations inevitably restrict India’s capacity to fully benefit from trade and investment partnerships.
A relatively dependent and uneven economy also raises questions about the true autonomy of India’s foreign policy. While New Delhi pursues a multi-alignment strategy—engaging simultaneously with the United States, Europe, Russia, and some Indo-Pacific democracies—each partnership carries its own uncertainties. Domestic turbulence in partner states, growing protectionism, and skepticism about India’s continuing ties with Russia have all complicated its external balancing strategy.
Consequently, India’s pursuit of multiple alignments in a world marked by strategic rivalry has led it to appear unreliable in the eyes of its partners because of the ambiguities created by India’s multi-alignment strategy. But perhaps most significantly, the real contradiction lies in India’s domestic capacity and foreign ambitions. Unless India can align its domestic transformation with its strategic ambitions, its capacity to emerge as a credible counterweight to China will remain limited.
Strategic rivalry between India and China is also evident beneath the surface of any economic cooperation. While New Delhi seeks cooperation that allows it to benefit from Chinese industrial inputs and technological expertise to advance its own growth, Beijing’s engagement remains largely selective — driven by efforts to deepen India’s economic dependence on China. India’s trade deficit with China reached a staggering $99.2 billion in FY 2024–25, and its reliance on China for essentials such as rare-earth minerals has revealed a significant vulnerability. In early 2025, China curtailed the supply of rare-earth minerals, fertilisers, and tunnel-boring machines to India. Although the restriction was lifted in August 2025, it had already taken a toll on the Indian economy, particularly by constraining production in the automobile sector.
Dependence on China is a liability New Delhi is determined to avoid. To mitigate such vulnerabilities — not only vis-à-vis China but any external power that might limit its strategic autonomy — India pursues a “multi-alignment” policy, engaging simultaneously with multiple major powers rather than aligning exclusively with one.
India Diversifies Strategic Partners: From Moscow to Paris
Since gaining independence in 1947, India maintained a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. However, the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union marked a significant shift, forging a deep strategic partnership that endured for decades. Russia remained India’s largest supplier of arms until the 2010s, when New Delhi began diversifying its defence portfolio. This was both because of India’s ‘superpower’ ambition which led it to prioritise self-reliance, and growing concerns over the quality of Russian equipment, procurement delays, and cost overruns. The Ukraine War in 2022 accelerated this process: India suspended and even cancelled several defence procurements due to supply chain disruptions, payment complications, and Russia’s own decision to limit arms exports.
Nonetheless, India did not completely forsake Russia for it still remains a major defence partner. Joint production continues, and India still manufactures Russian-designed weaponry. According to SIPRI, Russia was India’s top arms supplier from 2013 to 2022, although exports declined by 37%, with France filling much of the gap. This diversification also did not lead to hostility between New Delhi and Moscow. Despite U.S. pressure, India refrained from explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and from joining Western sanctions. Instead, bilateral trade expanded, especially in the energy sector, illustrating India’s effort to balance relations between both Washington and Moscow rather than aligning exclusively with either.
India’s multi-alignment approach and its drive to diversify arms imports paved the way for a deepening partnership with France. Between 2018 and 2022, India became the largest recipient of French arms exports, which accounted for nearly 30% of its total imports. Bilateral trade stood at $15 billion in FY 2023-24, though French foreign direct investment (FDI) struggled to gain ground. French retail giants such as Carrefour and Auchan struggled to perform well in Indian markets due to India’s restrictive FDI conditions and were forced to exit the market altogether in 2014. More recently, both countries have sought to revitalise their relationship to reduce dependency on both the U.S. and China. In February 2025, Prime Minister Modi visited France to secure a €10.6 billion arms deal, including the acquisition of Rafale jets—notably the same model shot down by Pakistan using Chinese weaponry—and Scorpene submarines. French defence equipment remains attractive to India despite its high cost, largely because it does not come with the operational protocols typically imposed under U.S. arms agreements.
President Macron also expressed France’s willingness to take the lead in the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) — announced at the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conceptually, IMEC promises regional integration and supply chain security, yet persistent instability in the Middle East, substantial financing constraints, and the European Union’s continued dependency on Chinese imports continues to hinder its progress. Nonetheless, the initiative reflects the growing willingness of other states to construct alternative frameworks to the increasingly unreliable structures offered by the existing great powers. The mounting government debt and social unrest over pension laws unleashed a political crisis, whose persistence has triggered a cyclical loop which continues to fuel economic and market uncertainity in the country. Amidst this, the growing support for the far-right ‘National Rally’, with its strong nationalist and protectionist policies, will certainly constrict France’s ability to enhance immigration, trade, and even security with India (and others).
India’s Indo-Pacific Partners
China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific put India in the spotlight for the U.S. Japan and Australia in 2007, when the four nations met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) — an initiative aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. After remaining dormant for nearly a decade, the QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, its members have intermittently coordinated on economic and security initiatives. Now, amid the growing perception of U.S. unreliability in upholding commitments under the second Trump administration, India seeks to deepen its engagement with multiple partners to diversify its strategic dependencies.
Before his visit to China, Prime Minister Modi stopped in Japan to meet then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Modi’s visit focused on economic diversification, with India pledging to supply the human capital that Japan urgently needs, while seeking to benefit from Japan’s technological expertise. Both sides agreed to a $68 billion investment framework over the next decade covering artificial intelligence, advanced technology, space cooperation, semiconductors, and rare-earth minerals, among other sectors. However, it remains to be seen how effectively India can capitalise on this foreign direct investment, given its domestic protectionist policies and persistent bureaucratic bottlenecks. Likewise, while Japan’s ageing population could benefit from increased immigration, internal political turmoil may impede such progress. With Prime Minister Ishiba’s resignation in early September, Japan is now poised to choose its fourth leader in five years, amid the rising influence of the far-right Sanseito Party, particularly known for its anti-immigration stance.
***
Five years ago, Australia and India signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which nearly doubled bilateral trade to $50 billionby 2023. Yet India accounted for only 0.6 percent of Australia’s total foreign direct investment (FDI), despite being viewed as a key overseas investment destination. This limited investment flow stems not only from India’s restrictive regulatory environment but also from the absence of robust guarantees by the Australian government to mitigate investment risks.Although the two countries signed the Critical Minerals Security Partnership in 2022—aimed at facilitating Australian investment in mineral exploration and developing alternatives to Chinese supply chains—the prospects remain uncertain amid heavy Chinese subsidies and, in response, substantial U.S. counter-subsidies.
Australia is also concerned by China’s growing regional influence and regards India as a potential partner to help balance it. However, unlike Japan and India, which both face direct territorial disputes with Beijing, Australia does not have any immediate security threat from China. This has contributed to its reluctance to expand defence and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, thereby constraining deeper strategic engagement with New Delhi. While multi-alignment strategy has opened potential possibilities of partnership with states, particularly those who share India’s China threat, the extent to which these partnerships could be deepened and strengthened remains a challenge. And not always does it work in the benefit of India to have multiple alignments, especially in an international system so complex.
India’s Russia Problem
Immediately after the SCO, Modi held telephone conversations with top EU leaders. After a successful Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with UK in May, India is now seeking the same with EU. Trade between the two has grown substantially: by 2024, the EU became India’s second largest trading partner accounting for 11.5% of India’s total trade. While the EU views India as a huge market for defence exports, the path towards an FTA is fraught with challenges. Russia remains a thorn in India’s efforts to maintain ties with the United States, and even the European bloc.
Putting aside President Trump’s insistence that the European Union impose 100% tariffs on Indian good, as a retaliatory measure for India’s alleged financing of the Ukraine War (India’s imports of Russian oil now account for 35-40% of its total energy requirements, a sharp rise from just 3% before the Ukraine War), India’s recent participation in the Russia-led defensive military exercises in Belarus in mid-September against possible NATO invasion has drawn sharp criticism from European diplomats. This development is especially concerning for the EU and the ‘West’, coming so soon after Russia’s violation of NATO airspace in early September.
The Limits of Multi-Alignment
India’s foreign policy primarily revolves around efforts to counter China’s growing influence, yet its broader engagement with the world remains marked by contradictions. It aspires to superpower status and economic self-reliance, but these ambitions are constrained by deep-seated domestic challenges and dependence on external partners for critical resources and technological expertise.
Structural weaknesses—such as an underdeveloped manufacturing base, stark development inequalities between the North and South, persistent rural–urban divides, and enduring social cleavages rooted in the caste system—undermine India’s internal cohesion. The rise of Hindu nationalist politics and intensifying communal tensions further complicate its international image, creating a political environment that is not conducive to inclusive economic growth or sustained global leadership. These domestic limitations inevitably restrict India’s capacity to fully benefit from trade and investment partnerships.
A relatively dependent and uneven economy also raises questions about the true autonomy of India’s foreign policy. While New Delhi pursues a multi-alignment strategy—engaging simultaneously with the United States, Europe, Russia, and some Indo-Pacific democracies—each partnership carries its own uncertainties. Domestic turbulence in partner states, growing protectionism, and skepticism about India’s continuing ties with Russia have all complicated its external balancing strategy.
Consequently, India’s pursuit of multiple alignments in a world marked by strategic rivalry has led it to appear unreliable in the eyes of its partners because of the ambiguities created by India’s multi-alignment strategy. But perhaps most significantly, the real contradiction lies in India’s domestic capacity and foreign ambitions. Unless India can align its domestic transformation with its strategic ambitions, its capacity to emerge as a credible counterweight to China will remain limited.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.