Obviously, this was not merely a three-way game: throughout Europe, as well as in America, any rapprochement between Germany and Russia brought back bitter memories. On the other hand, Paris was using Bonn, within the European Community, to counterbalance American weight and therefore could not oppose
Ostpolitik as resolutely as it might have wished to — especially considering that France was using Russia for the same anti-American purpose (and, for good measure, the anti-German one as well).
Whether innocent souls like it or not, this is how international relations work: every “friend” is also a threat, and every rival can become a “friend,” or even an “ally” (think of NATO, through which the Americans kept Germany — that is, Europe — “
down”), if doing so helps increase one’s relative weight vis-à-vis another rival. In plain terms: America used Russia to contain Germany, and Germany to contain Russia; France used Germany and Russia to counterbalance the United States; the United States used Britain to keep the French in check; and the British used the United States and France to keep Germany under control.
It may sound complicated, but once the myth of “alliances” is dispelled and we return to the reality of brigands dividing up the spoils, everything becomes immediately understandable.
The 1975 Helsinki Conference came at the culmination of what was then called “détente.” A brief digression is in order: relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had been very tense in Asia — where no Yalta-like division had taken place, with the exception of Korea, and where Japan was the bone of contention — but much less so in Europe, where the two countries’ interests did not always converge either. Moscow, for example, needed capital from Bonn despite Washington’s opposition; but, at the same time, it continued to need Washington in case German influence over its satellites should become a threat — as it had tangible reason to fear after Prague in 1968 and Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Gdynia in 1970.
The “détente” between the two superpowers, as they were then called, therefore had both a European and an Asian dimension. In Asia, the much-feared alignment between Russia and Japan had been thwarted: first, in the 1950s, by the Korean War, and then, in the 1970s, by the US-China agreement, following the failure in Vietnam. In 1972, when the Shanghai Communiqué was signed, China was a poor country, torn apart by a bloody civil war, and primarily concerned with avoiding falling into the clutches of Russia or, worse still, Japan. It was therefore open to cooperation with the United States, despite all the Maoist rhetoric about “imperialist paper tigers” (though we should not forget that a key reason behind the Chinese civil war — grandiloquently called the “Cultural Revolution” — was the relationship between Beijing and Washington).
The 1975 Helsinki “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” did indeed concern the Old Continent, but it had also been made possible by China.
Its essential purpose was to compel the Europeans, thirty years later, to countersign the Yalta agreements, at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were showing signs of weakening. It was the dam intended to slow the course of the Heraclitean river, in which, as everyone knows, one can never step twice.
The core of the final document concerned security: every European country was free to choose how and with whom to ensure its own security, provided it did not jeopardize the security of another European country. But this concept left an ambiguous grey area, which Russia would later exploit: where does my right to security end, and where does it begin to infringe upon someone else’s right to security?
That ambiguity did not dampen the enthusiasm of the champions of international law and friendship among peoples. Those who actually understood politics, on the other hand, immediately spotted the catch. This was especially true in the aftermath of the 1968 Prague Spring, crushed by Russian tanks, when the Kremlin leader, Leonid Brezhnev, set out his celebrated doctrine of “limited sovereignty” — a masterpiece of oxymoron, meaning that the Russians would take care of the “security” of Central and Eastern Europe, while the Americans would take care of that of Western Europe. Every European country (with the exception of Albania, then playing the role of an Adriatic North Korea) signed.
Only the champions of international law and friendship among peoples, however, believe that a piece of paper can serve as a dam against a river. Certainly, in Europe there was no reason for the Russians and Americans to jeopardize each other’s security; the trouble was that the United States and the Soviet Union were not the only countries in the world. And the world, meanwhile, kept moving forward. Everything flows.
In the years that immediately followed, Iran exited the American sphere of influence; war broke out in Afghanistan; the dynamite of Solidarność exploded in Poland; the Polish pope was the target of an assassination attempt; the Polish general Wojciech Jaruzelski led a coup to forestall a possible Russian invasion (with the Russians already bogged down in Afghanistan); and, last but not least, the Euromissile crisis erupted.
Let us dwell on this last point. The crisis was essentially triggered by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who, in a sense, exposed the fiction of American protection for Europe (or, more precisely, for Germany). His argument — although never explicitly formulated in these terms — was that Washington would not lift a finger to defend Germany if doing so risked threatening the United States itself. This argument was subsequently condensed into an effective rhetorical question: “Would the US risk Chicago for Hamburg?” Schmidt maintained that the deployment of new Russian missiles aimed at German territory had to be answered by the prompt deployment of new American missiles, with the aim of forcing Moscow into negotiations over a “zero option,” that is, the elimination of both sides’ missiles.
With Ronald Reagan in the White House, Schmidt’s strategy succeeded. Reagan was a man of passion, capable of imposing himself through his charisma and his quips; but, lacking any international politics training, he could not distinguish between the anti-Russian ideology inherited from Cold War propaganda and the strategic importance, for the United States, of Russian support in Europe. He willingly fell into Schmidt’s trap, setting off a dizzying arms race.
It was precisely that arms race, combined with the burden of the war in Afghanistan, that broke Russians’ back. In 1989, all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe declared their
de facto independence from Moscow, and in December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved, bringing
de jure independence to the fourteen republics that had until then been compelled to coexist with Greater Russia — including, of course, Ukraine. The attempt to save the empire in the form of a Commonwealth of Independent States proved a fiasco: everyone wanted to abandon the sinking ship.
Eleven months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany was reunified, despite the fierce but ultimately impotent opposition of France and the United Kingdom. Its eastern part — the so-called German Democratic Republic — moved without transition from the Russian military alliance (the Warsaw Pact) to the American military alliance.
This came not without some hard negotiations, but in those negotiations, Moscow “had no cards.” Mikhail Gorbachev managed only to extract a vague verbal promise from Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not move “one inch eastward,” a promise repudiated the very next day by President George Bush with a statement that fell like a verdict: “We prevailed and they didn’t.”
The collapse of the Soviet Union was a victory for Europe and a further downgrading of the United States. Within Europe, however, it was above all a victory for Germany and a source of serious concern for the United Kingdom and France. Certainly, the disappearance of the USSR helped make the birth of the European Union possible, and the French and British also recognized themselves in that newborn entity; but Germany’s relative weight on the continent had grown enormously. The Yugoslav wars of succession can be regarded as the first consequence of the German magnet’s new power of attraction.
Germany was now reaping the rewards of its
Ostpolitik investments, recovering its historical sphere of influence east of the Elbe. Thus, the German-led European Union already contained within itself the seeds of its eastward expansion — an expansion that opened the markets of those regions to French, British, and Italian capital as well, but which Washington could not allow to proceed without reacting.
We have already said it: for Washington, any rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin must be closely monitored and, if possible, thwarted. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson’s United States imposed the creation of a series of new states to serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and a new Hungary reduced to its minimum size); in 1945, Franklin Roosevelt’s United States simply abandoned those buffer states to the unyielding control of Russia. After the birth of the European Union, the only way to influence its eastward expansion was to “accompany” it — or rather, to get ahead of it — by extending NATO into those same territories; an expansion, moreover, enthusiastically welcomed in Warsaw — but also in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn — where the Germans are feared almost as much as the Russians.
This brings us to the third date: 1997, the year in which, despite James Baker’s promise, NATO moved full sail into territories already occupied (militarily and politically) by the Russians and on the verge of being occupied (economically and politically) by the Europeans — with the Germans well ahead of the others.
In 1997, Russia did not have the strength to oppose it. Boris Yeltsin did indeed object, but only verbally and to no effect. The Americans were certainly nervous about the European Union’s upward momentum and the magnetic appeal of its capital, but they were still under the influence of the highly pernicious intoxication of the “unipolar moment,” the “end of history,” and, above all, the handsome profits to be made from investments in China. They therefore paid little attention to Russian concerns. Indeed, they intervened in Yugoslavia to teach the Europeans a lesson: that they were able to light the fire but not to put it out. The Americans pretended not to notice that they were also teaching a lesson to the Russians, Serbia’s patrons.
It was not until 2002 that there was a kind of recognition of Russian anxieties, with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, an institution in which Moscow sat on a formally equal footing with the member states of the Atlantic Alliance. The “European security architecture” was back on the table, but the balance among the parties had changed once again. Russia had become something entirely different from the Soviet Union of 1975; the Europeans had grown bolder, and the Americans were beginning to see the dual threat posed by real rivals and competitors (not fictitious ones, like the erstwhile Soviet Union), namely the European Union itself and China. The NATO-Russia Council was a kind of mutual-aid society in which, according to America’s overambitious intentions, the Russians were to be kept in, the Chinese out, and the Europeans down — paraphrasing Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general.
The 2003 war in Iraq broke the European dynamic, for sure, but it also pushed Moscow into the arms of Paris and Berlin, and eventually weakened Washington disastrously, further muddling the overall picture.
In 2007, Vladimir Putin presented his grievances over NATO enlargement at the Munich Conference. In the Kremlin’s eyes, enlargement violated the principles laid down at Helsinki in 1975, insofar as extending security guarantees to the former Soviet sphere in Central and Eastern Europe came at the expense of Russian security. The ambiguity left unresolved at Helsinki was interpreted by the Russians as a prohibition against extending NATO into their former European sphere of influence.
The Putin of 2007 was not the Yeltsin of ten years earlier: this was due in small but significant part to differences in personality, in part to the brutal show of force displayed in the Second Chechen War, and above all to Russia's substantial economic recovery.
From that point on, events began to spiral and the “security architecture” fell apart. In February 2008, at Washington’s instigation, Kosovo declared independence, which Moscow perceived as a slap in the face because of its historical ties with Belgrade. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the Americans put forward the possible accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. In August, Russia invaded Georgia and created two puppet states within it, offering a practical demonstration of what might happen if Ukraine’s turn came. In December, the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO was formally included as an Alliance objective.
According to then-German chancellor Angela Merkel, this latter decision amounted, in the Kremlin’s eyes, to “
a declaration of war.” Putin himself
warned President Bush that “NATO is perceived by a large part of the Ukrainian population as a hostile organization… Relying on the anti-NATO forces in Ukraine, Russia would be working on stripping NATO of the possibility of enlarging. Russia would be creating problems there all the time.”
In the same conversation, Putin asked Bush what “the meaning of the Ukrainian membership in NATO” was. It was certainly a rhetorical question, because the Kremlin leader could hardly have been unaware that the American aim was essentially to drive a wedge between Russia and Europe (let us remember that when Americans write “Europe,” they read Germany) -- in other words, to turn Ukraine into a modern version of Woodrow Wilson’s buffer states of 1919. George W. Bush may not have been aware of this, but Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state, and Vladimir Putin certainly were.
Despite the “
reset” initiative with Russia launched by the Obama administration, the deployment of Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries in Poland was confirmed in 2009 and 2010. This subsequently led to the construction of an American missile defense complex at Redzikowo, Poland, integrated into NATO’s structure.
Let us remember that Russia has never regarded Ukraine and Belarus as truly independent countries. Until 2014, it exerted influence over Kyiv’s politics by relying on a tool inherited from the Stalin era: borders drawn with the purpose of incorporating substantial Russian minorities into the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.