BY MAnlio Graziano

The European Security Architecture

The Abu Dhabi talks on the war in Ukraine, one might be tempted to say, were a case of the mountain giving birth to a mouse. Except that there was no mountain to begin with.

Apart from the decision to exchange a thousand prisoners, little came of it. To justify the meeting, which was presented as a “turning point,” the prisoner exchange was played up. And yet it was only one of at least 75 such official exchanges since the war began, without any need to call upon the United States or the Emirates.

In reality, none of the protagonists expected much from these talks — overblown media reports aside — and expectations dwindled as the meeting drew closer. One thing did make them different from previous encounters, and it was not so much the face-to-face meeting between Russians and Ukrainians as the fact that the long-standing issue of the “European security architecture” had been put back on the table.

That was enough for the Russians to declare victory: the dossier about the war’s “root causes” was being reopened, containing what Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, and the other leaders in Moscow regard as the casus belli that must be resolved if the conflict is to end.

But what exactly is this famous “European security architecture”? To understand it, we need to look at three dates — 1945, 1975, and 1997 — which correspond to the main stages in that process, at least as the Kremlin sees it.

The first, February 1945, was the Yalta Conference (in Crimea!), where the Americans and Russians effectively partitioned Europe between them. The situation was this: the United States had won the war practically single-handedly, enabling the British and the Russians to take part in the annihilation of Germany (that is, Europe) thanks to the Americans' substantial and inexhaustible assistance. There was, however, one fundamental difference: the British were forced to accept the division, and to surrender to the Russians all their strongholds in Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Greece. The Russians, meanwhile, gained a territorial expansion, and an extension of their influence in Europe, in a way that even the most visionary of tsars would never have dared to dream of. Let us remember that the fable according to which Russia conquered half of Europe solely because of its insatiable expansionist appetite, overcoming “Western” resistance, would not begin to be told until 1947.

The reason for American acquiescence lies in the fact that it was not acquiescence at all. By allowing the Russians to take Warsaw, Prague, and Berlin — the crown jewel — the Americans were taking out a life insurance policy, getting rid of their real rivals and competitors: the Germans, certainly, but also the British themselves and the other troublesome Europeans. That insurance policy expired in 1989. In the meantime, the British Empire had disappeared, and London had become a “second-rank” power, as John Keynes had understood as early as the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.

That insurance policy, as we said, expired in 1989, the year in which Moscow lost control of its portion of Europe and left the United States to deal with the rest of the world on its own. In the meantime, however, many other things had happened, not just Britain’s demotion.

In 1989, neither Russia nor the United States was what it had been in 1945. Hardly surprising, since everything flows, as Heraclitus would have said. But precisely because everything flows, over those forty-four years Washington and Moscow had tried, together or separately, to build dams to at least slow that flow. The most important dam was built in 1975, the second date in our account, when the so-called “European security architecture” came into being, this time in Helsinki.

The most important upheaval in Europe between 1945 and 1975 was caused by Germany’s re-emergence. Although stripped of its eastern regions, the country had once again become an economic giant and, consequently, had begun to make its weight felt. While remaining within the political constraints imposed in 1945, Germany had managed, from the 1960s onward, to develop a strategy of its own, thanks precisely to its Wirtschaftswunder, its economic miracle. That strategy was called Ostpolitik and consisted of reopening direct channels with Moscow through the great exchange of capital for raw materials.

But did we not just say that Russia was effectively an ally of the Americans, with the principal aim of keeping Europe — that is, Germany — divided? Certainly. But a clarification is necessary here: Russia has always been structurally weak because it has always placed its own security ahead of economic development. The uprisings in Berlin in 1953, and then in Budapest and Poznań in 1956, convinced the Russians that they could no longer afford to treat Central and Eastern Europe as Belgium had once treated the Congo. Since they had to invest at least enough to prevent further revolts, the Kremlin found itself saddled with yet another economic burden.
Russia, therefore, desperately needed capital precisely to ensure that it could continue to keep its European satellites under its iron heel. The Prague uprising of 1968 made that need even more urgent. Germany, for its part, desperately needed raw materials, primarily energy resources, to keep its industrial machine running at full speed. Hence Ostpolitik.

The Americans could not simply stand by and watch. From the first tentative stammering of Ostpolitik, in the days of John Kennedy, successive administrations in Washington did everything in their power to prevent, or at least influence, direct contacts between Bonn (then the capital of West Germany) and Moscow. Their failure, in all essentials, was one indication of the United States’ declining ability to shape international relations, a consequence of the slowdown in its own development — not so much in absolute terms as relative to the impetuous growth of Germany (and of Japan on the Asian front, which forced Washington to intervene militarily in Vietnam).

Average annual GDP growth, 1950–1975

Source: Jean Fourastié, Les Trente Glorieuses ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975, Paris, Fayard, 1979.

Obviously, this was not merely a three-way game: throughout Europe, as well as in America, any rapprochement between Germany and Russia brought back bitter memories. On the other hand, Paris was using Bonn, within the European Community, to counterbalance American weight and therefore could not oppose Ostpolitik as resolutely as it might have wished to — especially considering that France was using Russia for the same anti-American purpose (and, for good measure, the anti-German one as well).

Whether innocent souls like it or not, this is how international relations work: every “friend” is also a threat, and every rival can become a “friend,” or even an “ally” (think of NATO, through which the Americans kept Germany — that is, Europe — “down”), if doing so helps increase one’s relative weight vis-à-vis another rival. In plain terms: America used Russia to contain Germany, and Germany to contain Russia; France used Germany and Russia to counterbalance the United States; the United States used Britain to keep the French in check; and the British used the United States and France to keep Germany under control.

It may sound complicated, but once the myth of “alliances” is dispelled and we return to the reality of brigands dividing up the spoils, everything becomes immediately understandable.

The 1975 Helsinki Conference came at the culmination of what was then called “détente.” A brief digression is in order: relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had been very tense in Asia — where no Yalta-like division had taken place, with the exception of Korea, and where Japan was the bone of contention — but much less so in Europe, where the two countries’ interests did not always converge either. Moscow, for example, needed capital from Bonn despite Washington’s opposition; but, at the same time, it continued to need Washington in case German influence over its satellites should become a threat — as it had tangible reason to fear after Prague in 1968 and Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Gdynia in 1970.

The “détente” between the two superpowers, as they were then called, therefore had both a European and an Asian dimension. In Asia, the much-feared alignment between Russia and Japan had been thwarted: first, in the 1950s, by the Korean War, and then, in the 1970s, by the US-China agreement, following the failure in Vietnam. In 1972, when the Shanghai Communiqué was signed, China was a poor country, torn apart by a bloody civil war, and primarily concerned with avoiding falling into the clutches of Russia or, worse still, Japan. It was therefore open to cooperation with the United States, despite all the Maoist rhetoric about “imperialist paper tigers” (though we should not forget that a key reason behind the Chinese civil war — grandiloquently called the “Cultural Revolution” — was the relationship between Beijing and Washington).

The 1975 Helsinki “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” did indeed concern the Old Continent, but it had also been made possible by China.

Its essential purpose was to compel the Europeans, thirty years later, to countersign the Yalta agreements, at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were showing signs of weakening. It was the dam intended to slow the course of the Heraclitean river, in which, as everyone knows, one can never step twice.

The core of the final document concerned security: every European country was free to choose how and with whom to ensure its own security, provided it did not jeopardize the security of another European country. But this concept left an ambiguous grey area, which Russia would later exploit: where does my right to security end, and where does it begin to infringe upon someone else’s right to security?

That ambiguity did not dampen the enthusiasm of the champions of international law and friendship among peoples. Those who actually understood politics, on the other hand, immediately spotted the catch. This was especially true in the aftermath of the 1968 Prague Spring, crushed by Russian tanks, when the Kremlin leader, Leonid Brezhnev, set out his celebrated doctrine of “limited sovereignty” — a masterpiece of oxymoron, meaning that the Russians would take care of the “security” of Central and Eastern Europe, while the Americans would take care of that of Western Europe. Every European country (with the exception of Albania, then playing the role of an Adriatic North Korea) signed.

Only the champions of international law and friendship among peoples, however, believe that a piece of paper can serve as a dam against a river. Certainly, in Europe there was no reason for the Russians and Americans to jeopardize each other’s security; the trouble was that the United States and the Soviet Union were not the only countries in the world. And the world, meanwhile, kept moving forward. Everything flows.

In the years that immediately followed, Iran exited the American sphere of influence; war broke out in Afghanistan; the dynamite of Solidarność exploded in Poland; the Polish pope was the target of an assassination attempt; the Polish general Wojciech Jaruzelski led a coup to forestall a possible Russian invasion (with the Russians already bogged down in Afghanistan); and, last but not least, the Euromissile crisis erupted.

Let us dwell on this last point. The crisis was essentially triggered by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who, in a sense, exposed the fiction of American protection for Europe (or, more precisely, for Germany). His argument — although never explicitly formulated in these terms — was that Washington would not lift a finger to defend Germany if doing so risked threatening the United States itself. This argument was subsequently condensed into an effective rhetorical question: “Would the US risk Chicago for Hamburg?” Schmidt maintained that the deployment of new Russian missiles aimed at German territory had to be answered by the prompt deployment of new American missiles, with the aim of forcing Moscow into negotiations over a “zero option,” that is, the elimination of both sides’ missiles.

With Ronald Reagan in the White House, Schmidt’s strategy succeeded. Reagan was a man of passion, capable of imposing himself through his charisma and his quips; but, lacking any international politics training, he could not distinguish between the anti-Russian ideology inherited from Cold War propaganda and the strategic importance, for the United States, of Russian support in Europe. He willingly fell into Schmidt’s trap, setting off a dizzying arms race.

It was precisely that arms race, combined with the burden of the war in Afghanistan, that broke Russians’ back. In 1989, all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe declared their de facto independence from Moscow, and in December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved, bringing de jure independence to the fourteen republics that had until then been compelled to coexist with Greater Russia — including, of course, Ukraine. The attempt to save the empire in the form of a Commonwealth of Independent States proved a fiasco: everyone wanted to abandon the sinking ship.

Eleven months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany was reunified, despite the fierce but ultimately impotent opposition of France and the United Kingdom. Its eastern part — the so-called German Democratic Republic — moved without transition from the Russian military alliance (the Warsaw Pact) to the American military alliance.

This came not without some hard negotiations, but in those negotiations, Moscow “had no cards.” Mikhail Gorbachev managed only to extract a vague verbal promise from Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not move “one inch eastward,” a promise repudiated the very next day by President George Bush with a statement that fell like a verdict: “We prevailed and they didn’t.”

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a victory for Europe and a further downgrading of the United States. Within Europe, however, it was above all a victory for Germany and a source of serious concern for the United Kingdom and France. Certainly, the disappearance of the USSR helped make the birth of the European Union possible, and the French and British also recognized themselves in that newborn entity; but Germany’s relative weight on the continent had grown enormously. The Yugoslav wars of succession can be regarded as the first consequence of the German magnet’s new power of attraction.

Germany was now reaping the rewards of its Ostpolitik investments, recovering its historical sphere of influence east of the Elbe. Thus, the German-led European Union already contained within itself the seeds of its eastward expansion — an expansion that opened the markets of those regions to French, British, and Italian capital as well, but which Washington could not allow to proceed without reacting.

We have already said it: for Washington, any rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin must be closely monitored and, if possible, thwarted. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson’s United States imposed the creation of a series of new states to serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and a new Hungary reduced to its minimum size); in 1945, Franklin Roosevelt’s United States simply abandoned those buffer states to the unyielding control of Russia. After the birth of the European Union, the only way to influence its eastward expansion was to “accompany” it — or rather, to get ahead of it — by extending NATO into those same territories; an expansion, moreover, enthusiastically welcomed in Warsaw — but also in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn — where the Germans are feared almost as much as the Russians.

This brings us to the third date: 1997, the year in which, despite James Baker’s promise, NATO moved full sail into territories already occupied (militarily and politically) by the Russians and on the verge of being occupied (economically and politically) by the Europeans — with the Germans well ahead of the others.

In 1997, Russia did not have the strength to oppose it. Boris Yeltsin did indeed object, but only verbally and to no effect. The Americans were certainly nervous about the European Union’s upward momentum and the magnetic appeal of its capital, but they were still under the influence of the highly pernicious intoxication of the “unipolar moment,” the “end of history,” and, above all, the handsome profits to be made from investments in China. They therefore paid little attention to Russian concerns. Indeed, they intervened in Yugoslavia to teach the Europeans a lesson: that they were able to light the fire but not to put it out. The Americans pretended not to notice that they were also teaching a lesson to the Russians, Serbia’s patrons.

It was not until 2002 that there was a kind of recognition of Russian anxieties, with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, an institution in which Moscow sat on a formally equal footing with the member states of the Atlantic Alliance. The “European security architecture” was back on the table, but the balance among the parties had changed once again. Russia had become something entirely different from the Soviet Union of 1975; the Europeans had grown bolder, and the Americans were beginning to see the dual threat posed by real rivals and competitors (not fictitious ones, like the erstwhile Soviet Union), namely the European Union itself and China. The NATO-Russia Council was a kind of mutual-aid society in which, according to America’s overambitious intentions, the Russians were to be kept in, the Chinese out, and the Europeans down — paraphrasing Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general.

The 2003 war in Iraq broke the European dynamic, for sure, but it also pushed Moscow into the arms of Paris and Berlin, and eventually weakened Washington disastrously, further muddling the overall picture.

In 2007, Vladimir Putin presented his grievances over NATO enlargement at the Munich Conference. In the Kremlin’s eyes, enlargement violated the principles laid down at Helsinki in 1975, insofar as extending security guarantees to the former Soviet sphere in Central and Eastern Europe came at the expense of Russian security. The ambiguity left unresolved at Helsinki was interpreted by the Russians as a prohibition against extending NATO into their former European sphere of influence.

The Putin of 2007 was not the Yeltsin of ten years earlier: this was due in small but significant part to differences in personality, in part to the brutal show of force displayed in the Second Chechen War, and above all to Russia's substantial economic recovery.

From that point on, events began to spiral and the “security architecture” fell apart. In February 2008, at Washington’s instigation, Kosovo declared independence, which Moscow perceived as a slap in the face because of its historical ties with Belgrade. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the Americans put forward the possible accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. In August, Russia invaded Georgia and created two puppet states within it, offering a practical demonstration of what might happen if Ukraine’s turn came. In December, the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO was formally included as an Alliance objective.

According to then-German chancellor Angela Merkel, this latter decision amounted, in the Kremlin’s eyes, to “a declaration of war.” Putin himself warned President Bush that “NATO is perceived by a large part of the Ukrainian population as a hostile organization… Relying on the anti-NATO forces in Ukraine, Russia would be working on stripping NATO of the possibility of enlarging. Russia would be creating problems there all the time.”

In the same conversation, Putin asked Bush what “the meaning of the Ukrainian membership in NATO” was. It was certainly a rhetorical question, because the Kremlin leader could hardly have been unaware that the American aim was essentially to drive a wedge between Russia and Europe (let us remember that when Americans write “Europe,” they read Germany) -- in other words, to turn Ukraine into a modern version of Woodrow Wilson’s buffer states of 1919. George W. Bush may not have been aware of this, but Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state, and Vladimir Putin certainly were.

Despite the “reset” initiative with Russia launched by the Obama administration, the deployment of Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries in Poland was confirmed in 2009 and 2010. This subsequently led to the construction of an American missile defense complex at Redzikowo, Poland, integrated into NATO’s structure.

Let us remember that Russia has never regarded Ukraine and Belarus as truly independent countries. Until 2014, it exerted influence over Kyiv’s politics by relying on a tool inherited from the Stalin era: borders drawn with the purpose of incorporating substantial Russian minorities into the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Linguistic map of Ukraine, 2014 (CNN)

Those minorities had played their part in elections, helping bring pro-Russian presidents to power, as can be seen in the maps below.
Results of the October 2004 and 2010 presidential elections. In October 2004, the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych won, but the vote was annulled after the so-called “Orange Revolution” and repeated in December, when it was won by the pro-European and pro-American Viktor Yushchenko. In 2014 Yanukovych won again but he was ousted in 2014 by the uprising known as the Maidan revolution, driven out of the country and replaced by Petro Poroshenko, who was easily elected because the Donbas and Crimea, occupied by the Russians, did not vote.
But after the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was driven from power by anti-Russian mobilizations for the second time, Moscow decided to switch gears and simply reannexed “its” regions. Thus the “spontaneous” uprising of Russians in Ukraine was staged in 2014, with the creation of two “independent” republics in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea.
The Germans and the French tried to salvage their relationship with Moscow through the two Minsk ceasefire agreements; but if they believed in them, they were probably the only ones who did. For the Moscow-backed separatists, the conquest of the Donbas was incomplete; for Ukrainian ultranationalists, the Donbas and Crimea had to be recovered; for the Americans, any understanding between Europeans and Russians had to be kept under control and possibly sabotaged; for the Russians (who declared themselves unrelated to those agreements because they allegedly were “not present” on the ground), the objective was neither the Donbas nor Crimea, but the whole of Ukraine.

Predictably, the Minsk protocols did not hold. Between late 2021 and early 2022, while deploying larger and larger numbers of troops along the Ukrainian border, Russia raised the stakes. What was now at stake was once again the 1975 “European security architecture,” in the Kremlin’s version: not merely the demand for the “Finlandization,” i.e., neutralization, of Ukraine, but even the withdrawal of NATO — or at least its troops and weapons — from the territories of the former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe.
Once again, the Russian leaders could not have been unaware that that was a no-starter for the US. The Germans and French once again tried to salvage what they could, but Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz, making a pilgrimage to the Kremlin in a last-ditch attempt, were humiliated and sent home empty-handed.

Events would seem to confirm that the Russians were convinced they held all the cards needed to topple the Zelensky government in a "special military operation" lasting just days, and replace it with some Ukrainian version of Lukashenko. Buoyed by the expected success of that blitz, they would have reactivated relations with the Europeans, not least through pipeline diplomacy, and made it clear to the Americans that the threats of 2008 had not been empty, and that any “reset” would now have to be on Russian terms — substantive and definitive.

We know how mistaken that assumption was. And we have confirmation that, as is almost always the case, the concentration of power and the lack of checks and balances make an apparently solid system extremely fragile: when unwelcome information is concealed, objections are mistaken for disloyalty, and the leader is surrounded by people who prefer to flatter rather than contradict him, the system gradually loses its ability to correct its own mistakes.

Russia has thus backed itself into a dead end that can be summed up in this paradox: not only has Ukraine not been “Finlandized,” but Finland itself has ended its neutrality and joined NATO, as has Sweden. After almost five years of war, during which it has failed to conquer even one-fifth of Ukrainian territory, Russia has damaged its relationship with the Europeans, lost face in all the other former republics of the Soviet Union, come close to a coup, depleted much of its resources, and brought the war onto its own territory. At the same time, it has increased its dependence on China enormously, risking, in the longer term, becoming a Chinese external province, as vast in territory as it is economically impoverished.

At a conference a few weeks after the initial failed attack on Kyiv, I publicly argued that Russia now had only three options left: collapse, as it had in 1917 and 1991; be rescued by China; or be rescued by the United States. Despite my audience’s skepticism, I cautiously favored the third possibility. The first could not be ruled out, because whenever Russia swells up like the frog trying to imitate the ox, it always risks bursting, as in La Fontaine’s fable. The second seemed to me too similar to the first, because for Russia to submit to China would amount to disappearing. The third seemed the most plausible for three reasons. Firstly, because the United States had (and still has) a greater interest in separating Moscow from Beijing than it had ever had in the past in separating Moscow from Berlin or Tokyo. Secondly, because Washington — at least until the arrival of the current administration of incompetents — had always wanted to keep the Russian card up its sleeve, as a source of leverage or counterweight in its relations with others. Thirdly, because, for Russia, the United States has never been a genuine threat, unlike Europe (whether in its French or German guise) and, above all today, China.

So to compare the recent Abu Dhabi talks to Yalta in 1945 is a completely misplaced anachronism. Back then, Washington dealt the cards and could afford to use Moscow against Europe because Russia was prostrate and, without American crutches, impotent; and Moscow was delighted to be used, above all because in return it received half of Europe. Today, by contrast, the United States and Russia, both reduced to pale and unsteady ghosts of their former selves, seem to be trying to prop each other up, with their eyes, of course, fixed on China — far more than on Europe.

Their relative advantage is that Europe, in fact, no longer exists — if it ever did. What we have are different European countries speaking with discordant voices, verging on mutual hostility, and stepping on one another’s toes, while one of them, France, is on the brink of collapse. A new “European security architecture” might well end up appealing to some of these ailing actors of the Old Continent, who might wish to be co-opted into a new anti-Chinese coalition. Washington and Moscow, for their part, could hardly ask for anything better than to divide the Europeans even more deeply than they already are.

It goes without saying that several obstacles stand in the way of a Russian-American agreement at Ukraine’s expense. The first is the United States itself, which is now without a strategy and is sailing by sight under the command of a blind captain. Donald Trump wants to force Ukraine to surrender simply because he is enthralled by Putin and wants to put his “peace” in Ukraine on his résumé, while still hoping for a real Nobel Peace Prize, not the piece of junk handed out by Fifa’s Gianni Infantino. He also wants to humiliate the Europeans, as he loves doing whenever the opportunity arises, probably without even knowing why. Today, he is in a hurry because he knows that the next Congress could reject any agreement with Moscow, not so much because of the new Democratic majority as because of the anti-Russian inertia of representatives and senators from both parties, still prisoners of the ideological narratives of the Cold War.

The second obstacle is China, which, at the next APEC summit in Shenzhen, will be the only one of the “big three” that is genuinely big. Xi Jinping is very likely to reshuffle the cards, exploiting the influence — whether born of affection or expediency makes little difference — that he exercises over his two ailing counterparts at the table. If he does so, we can be sure that he will do it without appearing either assertive or condescending, so as not to push the other two into each other’s arms. They will discuss many other matters in Shenzhen, but as far as Ukraine is concerned, the continuation of the war may well suit China, because Russia grows weaker with every passing day, while the United States and the Europeans are also being worn down by it — all to Beijing’s advantage.

The third obstacle is Russia, which continues to make demands — at Abu Dhabi as well — that are completely divorced from reality. It would appear that the “European security architecture” has once again become its number-one objective, just as it was five years ago, before Russia wore itself down in a senseless war. But if “security” is the objective, why continue to insist on the most absurd territorial claims ever made? Two hypotheses can be ventured. One is that, after the farce of “annexing” (without conquering, though) the entire Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk) and the oblasts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson -- a decision taken as early as 2022 to compensate domestic public opinion for the humiliation suffered on the battlefield -- reversing course would amount to publicly admitting defeat. The second hypothesis is simply the classic negotiating posture of someone who asks for twenty in the hope of getting ten, as if they were bargaining in a bazaar. There may also be a third, subsidiary hypothesis: that Moscow is counting on the complete breakdown of the United States in order to take the entire prize. None of these three hypotheses, moreover, excludes the others.

What is certain is that Russia did not wage this war to seize a few strips of land, but to take Ukraine in its entirety, or at least the “useful” part of Ukraine: the Donbas, Crimea, the Black Sea coast (and therefore Odessa), all the way to the border with Moldova — that is, Novorossiya (New Russia), conquered by Catherine II in the late 18th century and explicitly claimed by Putin in 2014.
It is equally certain that Moscow is in a hurry: the window of opportunity Trump has thrown wide open for it could close within weeks, at which point all its calculations would have to be revised — including the possibility of restoring relations with Germany (and perhaps with France too, especially if Marine Le Pen were to win next spring’s election), always with the aim of freeing itself from China’s excessively affectionate embrace.

The fourth obstacle is Ukraine. Moscow and Washington (in its current, wide-open-window-of-opportunity version) would gladly leap right over that obstacle. And it is almost certain that there are people in Kyiv and its environs who would like to do the same, settling for a few guarantees on paper — guarantees that in international politics are always worth little more than the ink with which they are written, and, in Moscow’s case, even less. The problem is that those ultranationalists who derailed the Minsk agreements are still active in and around Kyiv and would never agree to accept any territorial concession. They have moved from the militias into the regular army and are among those who have fought most fiercely at the front. Thinking that decisions can be made over their heads is a very dangerous gamble for Zelensky, as it would be for anyone else.

The fifth obstacle is Europe. For now, it is an obstacle in name only, in the sense that Europe exists only if one or both of the two main actors — the United States and Russia — allow it to exist. We saw this in Abu Dhabi, where the European delegation served only to worsen the carbon footprint and the energy crisis with an entirely unnecessary plane journey. But European leaders face a dilemma: if the war continues, sooner or later they will have to answer to their own voters, who are tired of paying for an endless war “that has nothing to do with them”; if the war ends, on the other hand, the pretext for arming themselves against a possible Russian aggression will go out like a candle deprived of oxygen.

Poland is a special case. For Warsaw, the “security architecture” in the Russian version would mean losing American protection, or at least seeing it weakened. Warsaw has a twofold interest in preserving that protection because, when it decided to place itself in American hands, it had Moscow — but also Berlin — in mind. In opposing this “architecture” Poland would almost certainly be joined by the three Baltic states, and perhaps by Sweden and Finland too. Moscow is well aware of this. We cannot therefore rule out the possibility that the Kremlin might once again float the old proposal, real or alleged, that has been discussed since 2014: offering Poland Galicia (the region around Lviv, or Lwów in Polish), in a friendly partition of Ukraine. Putin, after all, had described it in the 2008 conversation with Bush as an “artificial country” invented by the Bolsheviks (or rather, by Lenin), and which the Poles — who once dominated the region almost to the Black Sea — view much as Italians view Istria and Dalmatia, and Germans view Silesia, Pomerania, and Prussia.

Warsaw has always denied any possibility of such an agreement. This is partly because, in politics, trusting someone is always a step toward suicide, and trusting Moscow amounts to suicide; and it is partly because the memory is still raw of what happened less than a year after the triumphant annexation of Český Těšín (Czeski Cieszyn in Polish, Teschen in German), a Czechoslovak town “offered” by the Germans to Poland in October 1938, at the time of the occupation of the Sudetenland.

Nor can we rule out the possibility that this whole business of the “European security architecture” is merely a way of moving pieces on the board, buying time, repositioning oneself, and building a bridge beyond General Winter and beyond Donald Trump. After all, Trump, Putin, and Zelensky, but also Macron and perhaps Merz, are all approaching the end of their political shelf lives, and only Xi seems capable of outlasting them all. Perhaps this is what everyone has in mind.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.