On November 17, Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Hasina Wajid was sentenced to death by the country’s International Crimes Tribunal for her crackdown against the student protests last year which brought an end to her fifteen-year-long rule. Wajid resigned in August 2024 and fled to India where she currently resides. Her party – the Awami League – has been banned from participating in politics, members of the party have been persecuted, arrested, and forced to flee the country. 

Despite being at the forefront of the Liberation Movement and the 1971 War, the Awami League in office exhibited almost none of its supposed awami (of the people) characteristics. The party under Wajid ruled with an iron fist, with a poor human rights record, suppressing dissenters and political opponents and rigging elections. The student protesters, disenchanted with the poor economic outlook, questioned the fairness and legitimacy of the outcome of the January 2024 elections and demanded change.

Now, the interim government seeks to extradite Hasina Wajid from India before the expected General Elections in February 2026. Although the immediate causes of this development are internal, this is a major political shift in Bangladesh, which will certainly have international implications. 

A break in Bangladesh-India ties
The Awami League has traditionally been pro-Indian, with ties dating back to India’s support for the party during the 1971 Liberation War. During its tenure, even engagements with China had been cautious, and even more limited with the US. Under the Awami League, the Bangladesh-India ties were a proud demonstration of the success of India’s “Neighborhood First” policy – an Indian attempt to dominate the weaker states in its neighbourhood to maintain its regional superiority. Not anymore. Over the years, China has slowly entrenched itself as a critical foreign policy partner of the weaker Indian ‘vassal’ states of the region. 

China leveraged its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to extend economic benefits to Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and of course, Bangladesh. Today, as part of its ‘string of pearls’ strategy, it has influential control over some ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, which in turn has limited Indian control and influence in its waterways and neighborhood.

With the Awami League out of the running, Bangladesh has two main alternatives: Khalida Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jamat-e-Islami. Whether they are popular with the public is another thing, but both are known for their staunch anti-India policy. Should either assume power in February, India is likely to struggle to reestablish its foothold in Bangladesh. This complexity will only be compounded by Bangladeshi resentment over India’s decision to house Wajid, its treatment of Muslim and Bengali citizens, and disagreements over the upcoming renegotiation of the Ganges Water Treaty. 

What about China and the US?
More than India, China may have a better chance at improving ties with Bangladesh, considering it already has some footprint because of the BRI such as the Padma Bridge project – a road-rail network built over the Padma River connecting Dhaka to the less developed southwestern part of the country. China has also made sizeable investments in Bangladeshi ports and for the construction of an overland economic corridor to gain access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, as an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca. But geographic considerations will not be the only driving force behind China’s eagerness to fill the vacuum created by India. 

Although Washington’s decisions are highly unpredictable, it is possible that it would at least create a wedge to reduce China’s chances of dominating yet another state in the Indo-Pacific. To this end (and perhaps with the advantage of frustrating India), the Trump Administration has lowered the tariffs it previously placed on Bangladesh from 37 to 20%, signed a wheat import deal and is working with the Bangladeshi government for other deals (particularly those involving the export of Bangladeshi garments) to decrease Bangladesh’s trade deficit. 

The U.S. also seems to be making strides to decouple Russia and China – and the recent 28-point peace plan for Ukraine is evidence of this. If the US hopes to improve ties with Russia by offering concessions in Ukraine to put pressure on China (a reversal of US-China détente during the Cold War after Sino-Soviet Split), it is unlikely to come easy, given the fragility of success of the peace plan in Ukraine. But it is also difficult to decouple Russia from China because of Moscow’s deep economic dependence on China amidst global sanctions. The share of Chinese products in Russian imports jumped from 23% in 2021 to 57% in 2024, with a particularly rising dependency in strategic sectors of machinery and electrical equipment. 

Regardless, given the aggressive US posture that clearly treats China as a strategic rival, China will certainly respond to any and all opportunities to extend influence, at the expense of diminishing US influence. It did so by expanding diplomatic and economic influence in the Middle East, engaging Saudi Arabia, and, more recently, expanding its influence in Brazil (and, by extension, South America). 

What about Pakistan?
Of course, China is a greater strategic threat to India than Pakistan, but the long-standing rivalry between India and its western neighbor strongly manifests itself in Bangladesh and Afghanistan, arguably even more so after the recent May conflict between both nuclear rivals, and ongoing tensions at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

Pakistan has not forgotten the loss of its Eastern wing in 1971; a loss tied to Indian military intervention. When the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan in 1996 – Islamabad saw a pro-Pakistani Government in Afghanistan as a strategic tactic to counter India, and, as Tariq Ali argues, almost made up for the ‘loss of Bangladesh to India’. Now, as India expands its control in Afghanistan (with seriously weakening ties between Kabul and Islamabad as both exchange fires), Pakistan may seek to expand its diplomatic footprint in Bangladesh to counter that influence. Perhaps rejuvenated by the performance in the recent conflict with India, Pakistan is already asserting itself in the greater region – as evidenced by the recent defence agreement with Saudi Arabia. 

Even with Bangladesh, the signs are already visible. Army and Naval Chiefs of both countries met each other in Islamabad earlier this year to improve defence cooperation. In February 2025, both countries resumed direct trade for the first time since 1971. While Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and caretaker Bangladeshi Prime Minister Muhammad Yunus had met on the sidelines of international forums, Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Bangladesh last August was the first since 2012. Both countries expressed interest to increase economic cooperation and increase people-to-people exchange in education, tourism, sports, while easing restrictions on visa-acquisition procedures for citizens of both states. Although these are positive developments, the memories of the 1971 Liberation War are still fresh in Bangladesh, with many demanding a formal apology from Pakistan before both countries can move ahead. 

What’s next for Bangladesh?
Given the interconnected nature of politics, it is not wise to assume that a domestic matter will remain domestic. The domestic structural socio-economic concerns which caused the upheaval in the first place will remain unless addressed by the incoming government in the expected elections in February next year. This is not an easy task as it is, but it will be made difficult as regional powers rush to fill the vacuum to secure theirgreater interests. Bangladesh will find itself balancing both foreign and domestic realignments. 

It is clear that Bangladesh’s foreign policy is undergoing a structural readjustment as it moves away from India to develop stronger ties with other states such as China and Pakistan. India now lacks the political leverage to restore its relationship with Bangladesh (which it enjoyed under Awami League); China has the will, resources, and now an opportunity to expand its footprint; while both the US and Pakistan will seek to assert themselves to counter their respective strategic rivals.